Ryan Panchadsaram
‘There is Not One Single Owner of the Digital Service’: Ryan Panchadsaram on the USDS as a Collective Endeavor
| Ryan Panchadsaram was Deputy Chief Technology Officer at the White House from 2014 to 2016. Prior, he advised the Chief Technology Officer, and before that served as a Presidential Innovation Fellow. |
As White House Deputy Chief Technology Officer in 2014, Ryan Panchadsaram had a unique perspective on the USDS’s formation. He saw the organization take shape in the aftermath of the troubled HealthCare.gov launch, and soon after worked with colleagues to develop a playbook of best practices — a resource for others at the intersection of technology, design, and public service.
Below, Ryan discusses the organization’s growth, early tensions with other digital service entities, and the anxiety that comes with signing your name on a memo to the President of the United States.
June 27, 2019
Kathy Pham:
Ryan, what were the seeds for USDS getting started?
Ryan Panchadsaram:
So many different things were happening. We had talent bubbling and percolating across government: Presidential Innovation Fellows (PIFs) and Chief Technology Officers (CTOs) and Chief Data Officers (CDOs). It was very entrepreneurial and was often at the edges. If what folks were trying to do was successful, it was something to celebrate. But if it was not successful, you’d move on and try again.
Technologists never really had a seat at the table. Things started to change when you had the first CTO, Aneesh Chopra. He focused on policy. Then Todd Park came in and built on Aneesh’s work. He focused internally and said, “We’re going to go help the agencies. Not as the White House, but by embedding and supporting existing teams.”
You also had this example of what’s possible with the UK Government Digital Service (GDS). There’s all this energy: Jen Pahlka is there as Deputy CTO, you’ve got the CIO’s office with Steven VanRoekel and Haley Van Dyck. I’m there, working for both Jen and Nick Sinai. We thought: “How do we replicate what’s happening in the UK? Because it looks like it is working.”
The HealthCare.gov crisis was years ago, but it’s still vivid. It proved that a highly motivated, well-experienced group of technologists can pair up with an agency and make successful things happen. While that was happening, the core team was thinking, “We need to start this unit.” There was a lot of debate: Where does it live? Those discussions were incredibly passionate, because everyone wanted to be the “digital service.”
What ended up happening is very U.S. government. We’re not one central place like the GDS (in the UK). Two threads formed. One was GSA saying, “We want to create a contracting organization called 18F, where we get people who build. We’re going to be a service company.” At the same time, USDS says, “We’re going to partner with cabinet agencies and secretaries to help them in what they’re doing.”
In early 2014, the HealthCare.gov crisis was coming to an end. We had been able to recruit a world of people for two weeks on, two weeks off, but it was apparent that we were missing experienced technologists at the table. They weren’t there for the most important meetings. But the HealthCare.gov crisis pulled us in: myself, Todd Park, and Kurt DelBene.
Kurt has a world of experience from Microsoft (as President of Microsoft Office), an ability to translate at the most senior levels. Leaders in government like Kathleen Sebelius, Marilyn Tavener, and Cecilia Munoz saw a lot of value in this. They started to see how all of the grand ambitions of policy balance on building good, usable technology. If one component doesn’t work, we end up failing to deliver on that policy.
In the 90 days after the HealthCare.gov crisis, there was a massive sprint to create USDS. You had buy-in from the President. You have Beth Cobert at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) helping us craft what a digital service could look like. We were all working toward three big things to get the President’s sign off on a memo: people, process, and procurement. On the people side, it was about launching the digital service. Process was about the digital services playbook. And on the procurement side, we suggested things that needed to be changed.
We were trying to find a head of the USDS. Todd had moved back to California and was doing a lot of recruiting. Mikey Dickerson was always high on the list, but wasn’t initially open to doing it after the crisis. We met a lot of folks, but no one had the credibility that Mikey did.
There was a lot of head-butting happening with OMB and the CIO’s office. The CTOs office did not take a side, but asked: “How do we bring in all the parts and pieces? Because this thing has to happen.”
At this time, we also decided to run a few sprints at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Andy Ruff and Dave Vener did a sprint, delivered a thoughtful and detailed report, and then returned to their day jobs. We learned very quickly from that sprint: You need to have the people who write the report stay around to implement it. For HealthCare.gov, we not only wrote the report, but we also had to execute upon it. So we did another sprint at the VA, but longer, with David Recordon and Ben Mauer.
At this point it was me, Charles Worthington, Mollie Ruskin, and Erie in the CTO’s office. And we knew we needed to create a playbook: What did we learn from HealthCare.gov? How do you run and build amazingly scalable, useful things? The playbook was an incredibly collaborative effort; a lot of input from other folks. We would send it back out over the pond to folks back in New York and in the Valley and ask, “What do you think about this?” A lot of credit goes to Charles and Mollie.
Charles and Mollie were some of the best working relationships I’ve had. The three of us were always going back to our roots, asking: “Is this something we would use ourselves?” Charles brought the product management, Mollie brought design. One thing I feel bad about was how we got capital-T Technologists to the table, but we didn’t get design at the table. We still have so much more room to grow on that front.
At the CTO’s office, we’ve always known we can start things, but we can never fully own them, because we disappear every four years. So our objective from the beginning was: How do you seed USDS with the right people and funding so it can exist on its own? And so we started recruiting. There was this round-table with Megan Smith, Lisa Gelobter, David Recordon, and others. Todd was stepping down and looking for his replacement. So we needed to put these people in a room and have the President come in and say, “This is important to me.” You had a lot of recruiting being done behind the scenes, even before USDS was launched.
That 90-day window felt like three years. We were figuring out: How do you do the paperwork piece of USDS? How do you make the playbook? How do you hire the right people? And how do you launch it, from a press point of view, in a way that makes this thing special and a desirable place to work?
The memo was a very special moment in my career. With Todd moving back to San Francisco, there was no CTO for two weeks. The memo to the President needed to come from someone, but there was no CTO. Cristin Dorgelo said, “Ryan, you represent OSTP. You have to put your name on the memo.” So the memo had the CTO’s Office and OMB on it — collective ownership.
Then Mikey agrees to come on board with Haley as his deputy. I wouldn’t say the rest is history, but the ball starts to get rolling. There is a place, there’s a team, there’s people, there’s funding. Technically, employee number one was Erie. Todd, Steve VanRoekel, and I said, “We need to start hiring people — and there’s no one that embodies this work better than Erie.” Charles ended up joining immediately after. Emily, when did you join?
Emily:
My story is sort of a parallel track. I had joined the VA in the summer of 2013 to help the then Assistant Secretary of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs reimagine how the VA engages with Veterans. A couple weeks later Marina came to the VA as CTO, and soon after 3 PIFs joined as well: Ben Willman, Tom Black, and Mollie Ruskin. We quickly gravitated toward each other, and then Mollie started pulling me into things outside of the VA, which is how I started working with you all to figure out how to hire the first VA cohort.
Ryan:
That’s a piece that’s missing in USDS storytelling. You’d think the first hires magically showed up from outside government. But that was not true. A lot of us had a couple months to years of experience in government.
The “people” ask to the President was for his time in recruiting. And he committed to that. I remember a recruiting session in San Francisco where Kim Rachmeler was asking the hardest questions to the President of the United States. And his responses were incredible. The President knew what we were doing better than what we knew what we were doing, from the people point of view. He always understood that you bring people together and you point them toward causes that they passionately believe in. He loved doing this. He was a recruiting machine.
At this point, USDS was 15 people, and then 20 people. It was starting to grow. There ended up being a point when USDS and 18F could stand on their own, so there wasn’t a reason for the CTO’s office to be in the weeds. We’ll be there for guidance and celebratory things, but for the technical stuff, these teams were phenomenally well-equipped. I won’t lie — it wasn’t easy to get to that point. There were a lot of rough edges; it wasn’t the prettiest. 18F was on their own, they wanted to do it their way — that’s conviction. It just shows that everybody was so passionate about what they were doing.
Emily:
I think it’s safe to say there were countless obstacles, and many people who didn’t want this to happen – or perhaps just didn’t understand the need. But there seem to have been some critical turning points that created momentum. Those turning points are key to understanding how change can happen — and stick — in government. What worked in terms of changing minds?
Ryan:
The powers that be didn’t want it to happen. VanRoekel was always a fan, but some on the CIO team thought, “Isn’t this supposed to be us?” I always felt like you had to break bread with them, show them that together we can do more. USDS is focused on tactical engagements with agencies; the CIO’s office is about government-wide engagement and compliance. The CIO’s office needs to stop focusing on the fires, because those distract them from its job.
People liked working with Charles, Mollie, Todd and myself. We knew this was going to be hard, and we knew that throwing elbows wasn’t the right way. But there was credibility that both Todd and I could bring, because this was just months after the HealthCare.gov disaster turned into a success, with 7 to 8 million people enrolled. If we didn’t have that credibility, I don’t think we could have gotten as much through. If you asked Todd about the USDS strategy at that time, he’d say, “Well, we did the same thing over there.” And if you asked me, I’d say, “Well, we applied it over here.” And people would say, “Okay, this is great.”
You also started to have this hunger. For example, in the earliest moments, the Domestic Policy Counsel (DPC), who felt a lot of pain from the Affordable Care Act, asked, “Can you keep coming back for these other things? I see how this group of people can be used for good.”
Also, our sprints needed to be run by a team with the right talent and people. I loved when Kathy joined USDS because Kathy, you’re both an engineer and a product person. I always felt that we needed more product DNA early on in USDS. The product-focused leads were really successful. That’s there today, but in the beginning, we didn’t have enough of that.
Emily:
So you went from “the powers that be didn’t want it to happen” to “we have a green light, go.” How did it go from the green light to an operational group of people?
Ryan:
There’s a lot there. First it was just Mikey Dickerson, Haley Van Dyck, and Erie Meyer. One year later, in October 2015, there was a whole gathering of folks. But the effort to start the digital service was never locked in stone; its success was never guaranteed.
When did it feel like it absolutely could happen? There was this moment post-HealthCare.gov, where all eyes were on Todd Park. Todd proved that bringing in technologists and applying them to the most important problems could help, and he had an idea to scale that.
One of Todd’s lessons to us was that you have to go to an agency and find the three to four other people that also have your idea, and work with them to make it come to life. Celebrate them. And give them all the credit. Because we’re going to be here for six months, and these folks are going to be here for the next five to 10 years. Todd embodies that saying, “No pride in authorship.”
Todd had the ability to get the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the chief of staff into the same room. And he then depended on a lot of us to make peace. Because there were still a lot of fiefdoms. When you look back at history, you might think 18F, the Presidential Innovation Fellows (PIFs) and USDS should have been one unit. But they wanted their independence, and that was one of the best things that could happen. PIF was about entrepreneurship, 18F was about building and execution, and USDS was about policy, execution, and fixing big problems that were already underway. But it was never crafted to be that way in the beginning.
They attracted three very different kinds of people. If you were a builder or entrepreneur, you’d be at PIF. If you were an engineer who wanted to build things from scratch, you’d go into 18F. If you were into systems change, you’d go to USDS. And there were really good bridges between the groups, even though the leads were sometimes elbowing each other.
Kathy:
Were there documents or policies in place for this?
Ryan:
First, in August, we released the USDS playbook and TechFAR handbook and engaged with the private sector for feedback and comments. The playbook is a collection of 13 plays that help agencies deliver more effective digital services. The plays are drawn from private sector practices and the HealthCare.gov experience. The TechFAR is a myth-busting guide that highlights the flexibilities in the FAR that can help agencies implement the playbook.
Emily:
Do you recall milestones as these things were being built?
Ryan:
One pivotal moment was when 18F decided to go their own way. There had been all this energy around “Let’s do this together.” And then that broke apart.
The next moment was at the end of HealthCare.gov, when Department of Veterans Affairs Secretary Bob McDonald, Chief of Staff Denis McDonough, Deputy Chief of Staff Kristie Canegallo, and other senior staff at the White House realized that more of these problems were happening, and that other agencies needed help too. They realized doing it in a one-off manner wasn’t going to be successful. Todd used that moment to get the President to commit to USDS. At that moment, there was no contention anymore about, “Are we going to do it or not?”
Another milestone was around June 2014, when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) granted USDS Schedule A hiring authority.
Kathy:
The hiring authority bit is something everyone has to know about. It’s not often talked about, but unless you have it, you can’t hire a single person.
Ryan:
Todd gave me a point of view on management. He would say, “Ryan, let’s go fix it.” And I would start diving in solo. But he would stop me and say: “No, you can’t fix it by yourself. You need to build a team.” So there was this next chapter: How do you build the right team and nurture them? Todd had this ability to pull you into a group, empower you, and then he would slowly disappear, but you never noticed he disappeared. Because if you ever needed anything, he’d be there in the blink of an eye. It’s so authentic. It’s so Todd. It’s like he’s there with you in the trenches, sleeping on the floor, and he then goes to where the next problem needs him.
Kathy:
Ryan, what are your proudest moments and contributions throughout all of this?
Ryan:
I was really proud to carry the torch from HealthCare.gov to USDS. HealthCare.gov was exhausting, but also a call to arms. We had this one chance, truly, to do something. And being a part of that journey, taking everything we’ve learned and applying them to USDS. And then getting to that point where USDS — and 18F and the PIFs — all stand on their own. They’re quite vibrant and beautiful on their own, and they’re growing.
There’s a beauty in only knowing you’re going to be there for a short time. For me, it was always “six more months.” With that mentality, the team fiefdom mindset doesn’t happen, because you’re like, “I want to make the best happen while I’m here.” And you always have to balance that kind of energy with the fact that there are people here longer than us, the career folks at USCIS and OPM and the General Services Administration (GSA)
Emily:
People’s finite time in government was liberating in some ways. Am I hearing that right? It allows you to think differently about things and operate differently?
Ryan:
It was. We were there to optimize our time, not because of the money. But that narrative of, “We can’t pay you what you are worth” is problematic. Because the pay that you can make in government is actually good, depending on what industry you come from.
Kathy:
How did things change over time?
Ryan:
The story that the CTO’s office played as time went on was about recruiting and helping speak up for USDS in rooms where they weren’t. Megan deserves a lot of credit for helping build support for USDS and the techies in government.
But the most beautiful thing is, by the time the administration ended, we all were walking in and out the West Wing attending the meetings that mattered. That kind of access and engagement and asking for our professional opinions never was there before.
Emily:
That is such a great point. That access was a physical symbol of a mindset shift… that technologists were valuable at the policy table.
Ryan:
Some other fun visuals that I like to think about: I was part of the past era, which had to wear suits and ties every day. Then Mikey comes in and we recruit a whole world of people who say, “That’s not how we get respect. I get respect by what I bring to the table.” That was really powerful from a culture point of view.
The most poetic thing about the digital service is that so many people’s individual actions made it what it is. There is not one single owner of the digital service. There is not one single person that could have done it by themselves.
We needed a crisis to happen. We needed people who were interested in budget, we needed people who were interested in hiring, and then we needed a lot of people to take a humongous leap of faith and say, “I’m going to spend two to four years here.” That’s why it’s so beautiful.
It’s also the hardest case study on the planet, because there’s no one thing. There are four or five threads, including funding, people, and the right moment.
When you put this thing together, you’re showing all the other stories that no one got to see. Now I’m smiling, thinking of Erie Meyer, who is a cultural embodiment of what USDS is — and employee number one. She set the tone, she set the culture. You remove any of the people in those earliest days, and it wouldn’t have been as special as it was. Like Vivian Graubard. You also have to acknowledge the sheer persistence of leaders like Haley, who carried this thread from the campaign in 2008 to the launch in 2014.
Emily and Kathy, thank you so much for doing this!
Emily:
Thank you so much for taking the time to talk with us.